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Abstract 
Unlike most historical accounts of strategic change inside large firms, empirical research 
on strategic management rarely uses the day-to-day behaviors of top executives as the unit of 
analysis. By examining the resource allocation process closely, we introduce the concept of a 
deep dive, an intervention when top management seizes hold of the substantive content of a 
strategic initiative and its operational implementation at the project level, as a way to drive new 
behaviors that enable an organization to shift its performance trajectory into new dimensions 
unreachable with any of the previously described forms of intervention. We illustrate the power 
of this previously underexplored change mechanism with a case study, in which a well-
established firm overcame barriers to change that were manifest in a wide range of 
organizational routines and behavioral norms that had been fostered by the pre-existing structural 
context of the firm.   
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One of my favorite perks was picking out an issue and doing what I called a “deep dive.” 
It’s spotting a challenge where you think you can make a difference… 
then throwing the weight of your position behind it.   
I’ve often done this –   
just about everywhere in the company.
1 
(Jack Welch, former chairman and CEO, General Electric) 
 
 
The role of top management in bringing system-wide changes to an organization has long 
been a central concern among scholars of strategic management (Barnard, 1938; Chandler, 1962, 
Selznick, 1957). The complexity of real organizational phenomena (Allison, 1971) has led 
researchers to examine the issue of why, how, and what kind of changes, both planned and 
emergent, occur in large firms (e.g., Bower, 1970; Quinn, 1980; Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985; 
Pettigrew, 1985). In more recent years, the quest to understand the inner workings of firms and 
their change mechanisms has evolved into three distinct research streams that identify different 
processes or structures for enabling top management to effect major transformations. 
Organizational ecologists have argued that changes are the result of a continuous process of 
variation, selection, and retention that occurs within an organization (Burgelman, 1983a; 
McKelvey, 1982; Miner, 1990; Galunic and Week, 2002). Top management therefore must align 
internal selection criteria with external selection pressures, thereby promoting organizational 
adaptation and long-term survival (Burgelman, 1991). Scholars of organizational ambidexterity, 
on the other hand, have argued that organizations need to accommodate the tension between 
exploitation and exploration in order to achieve long-term success (Levinthal and March, 1993; 
                                                            
1  Welch, J and Byrne, A. J. (2001). Jack: Straight From the Gut. Warner Business Books.  
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Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). It is important for top management to serve as the point of 
integration between contrasting agendas of structurally differentiated units (Smith and Tushman, 
2005), or, alternatively, to develop an organizational context that helps managers throughout the 
firm to think and act ambidextrously (Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004; Mom, Van, and Volberda, 
2007). In contrast to these two groups of scholars who emphasize the role of top management in 
maintaining the continuity of various change processes, advocates of a punctuated-equilibrium 
model of change distinguish long periods of convergence – during which an organization makes 
only incremental changes – and brief periods of revolution – when qualitative, metamorphic 
changes occur (Miller and Friesen, 1984; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Gersick 1991). An 
overall reorientation of existing activities comes only when major changes sweep through an 
organization, transforming its strategy, structure, power distribution, and control mechanisms – 
all at the same time (Virany, Tushman and Romanelli, 1992).   
Together, the literatures on organizational ecology and ambidexterity depict top 
managers as organizational architects who design and actively maintain the formal and informal 
structure of the firm so that necessary changes can be brought forward by managers from all 
ranks. Senior managers set a general vision and endorse strategic plans, but they do little to 
define the substantive content of these changes. Meanwhile, the punctuated-equilibrium model 
presents an alternative view that portrays incumbent top management as normally passive and 
inertial during the convergent period, allowing the firm to slip into an eventual crisis in 
performance before attempting an overall reorientation of the company.   
Nonetheless, these three research streams collectively describe a role for top management 
that is at times inconsistent with some of the most careful accounts by business historians of the 
strategic changes undertaken by large firms (e.g., Chandler, 1962; Rosenbloom, 2000; Jones,  
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2005; Tedlow, 2006). Historians documented how top management directly interacted with 
lower-level managers concerning the substance of specific operational details in order to insure 
the correct implementation of new strategic initiatives necessary for the organization in the face 
of a changing environment. Repeatedly, chief executives are shown to be much more involved in 
the day-to-day operations of their firms than prior research streams imply.     
To comprehend the wide gap between the imagery conveyed in current literature and the 
actual phenomena of complex organizations, consider the role Steve Jobs played during the 
move by Apple into music-playing devices – a move that transformed the company from a niche 
computer maker that had been focusing on advanced functionality, reliability, and ease of use for 
technical enthusiasts into a global electronic powerhouse that brought aesthetics and fashion in 
product design to mass consumers. When Apple first introduced the iPod in October 2001, the 
project was set to meet an impossibly short schedule imposed top-down by CEO Jobs. To meet 
the project deadline, Jon Rubinstein – then head of hardware – had to swiftly assemble an 
engineering team that focused on integrating third-party, standardized components into a small 
package.
2  In the past, Apple typically designed its computers from scratch, using unique chips, 
disk drives, and monitors, proprietary operating systems, and many specially designed 
peripherals.
3  Relying on outside vendors for undifferentiated technologies was simply not 
acceptable. Yet the time constraint set by Jobs forced the iPod project team to experiment with a 
new engineering approach that delivered the required product features, not just on time, but also 
at a much lower cost and with virtually no upfront investment in product development – a critical 
condition for profiting from an inexpensive music-playing device with a much shorter product 
life cycle and considerably lower profit margins.        
                                                            
2  Young, J. S., and Simon, W. L. (2005). ICon: Steve Jobs, the greatest second act in the history of business. 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
3  Yoffie, David B., and Michael Slind. "Apple Inc., 2008." Harvard Business School Case 708-480.  
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Besides controlling the project schedule, Jobs continued to stay close during project 
implementation. Colleagues reported that the CEO would be “horribly offended [if] he couldn’t 
get to the song he wanted in less than three pushes of a button.”
4 He also insisted that the user 
interface should be modeled on Palm’s HotSync software so that the iPod could transfer songs 
seamlessly from iTunes.
5  A year later, while the product team was busy releasing the Windows-
compatible iPod, Jobs became the first person to persuade all major record labels to make their 
music available online. To realize the 99-cents-per-song pricing scheme, he personally 
conducted early demonstrations of iTunes to top executives and leading artists in the industry.   
Even more radically, Jobs later convinced the iPod division to take away much of what 
had made an iPod great – the display, the large storage space, the wheel, and the menu-driven 
interface – and launched the iPod Shuffle in 2005. Despite the loyalty of his staff at Apple, Jobs 
recalled, he was almost “thrown out of the room” when he first proposed this “crazy idea.”
6 
Finally, in anticipation of the changing product mix of the company, when Apple expanded its 
direct presence in retail distribution, the CEO personally handpicked a former executive from 
Target and chartered the new team to model high-end boutiques – a brilliant move in hindsight, 
especially since the first Apple store was actually opened during the time when Dell's online 
sales approach was still being hailed as the best practice for the computer industry.
7 By  2007, 
more than 100 million iPods had been sold, accounting for almost half of Apple’s revenues. The 
company, at the same time, transformed from a niche computer manufacturer that had 
historically targeted a narrow audience with a strong emphasis on engineering ingenuity, into a 
                                                            
4  Kahney, Leander. "Inside Look at Birth of the iPod." wired.com: July 21 2004. 
5  Kahney, L. (2008). Inside Steve's brain. New York, NY: Portfolio. 
Levy, S. (2006). The perfect thing. Simon and Schuster 
6  Levy, S. (2006). The perfect thing. Simon and Schuster 
7  Thomke, Stefan H., and Barbara Feinberg. "Design Thinking and Innovation at Apple." Harvard Business School 
Case 609-066.  
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consumer electronics powerhouse that was thoroughly mainstream in its product offerings and 
attracted mass consumers by crafting seamless user experiences across all the Apple devices.   
When is this sort of direct intervention by top management functional? And why? The 
existing literature lacks a systematic way to conceptualize the type of managerial behavior 
exemplified in the Apple case, nor does it explain why this kind of (arguably) overbearing, top-
down intervention is common. Strategic management theory typically posits an important role 
for top management in formulating strategy and shaping resource allocation. The sort of 
involvement exhibited by Steve Jobs is seen only as the idiosyncratic behavior of an entrepreneur 
that sometimes pays off, or worse, as nearly pathological interference.   
We argue that, on the contrary, there is an identifiable class of special circumstances in 
which top management intervention of this sort is vital – a functional role exists for such direct 
intervention. Our study reveals that when an implementation of a new strategy requires the 
operating organization to make major progress along new dimensions of performance (Adner and 
Levinthal, 2008), the personal involvement of a very high-level executive, perhaps the CEO him- 
or herself, becomes critical. That is, top management must take a deep dive.  
We label a top-down, proactive intervention a deep dive when top managers of a large 
firm bypass the entire managerial hierarchy, well before any overall crisis, 1) to define concrete 
objectives of corporate projects directly, 2) to sponsor and select those initiatives personally, and 
3) to maintain a strong presence throughout the phase of project implementation. A deep dive 
differs from top-down strategy formulation and resource allocation. It implies a heavy 
involvement from top executives with fine-grained and technical specifics, well into the stage of 
actual implementation of those project initiatives. In taking a deep dive, top management  
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overrides pre-set change routines and existing decisional priorities across levels and functions 
inside the firm. 
This paper’s argument is developed in four sections. In the first section, we describe how 
a high-performing firm organizes its activities. A high degree of complementarity among firm 
activities enables a company to pursue its strategy effectively. Core activities of the firm – those 
most connected with the rest of the system – are critical in realizing the basic aspects of the 
chosen strategy. But at the same time, core activities confine the firm’s performance trajectory to 
a limited number of dimensions, because they are built to improve, over time, only certain kinds 
of product attributes. Therefore, when a firm shifts to a new strategy and seeks to make major 
progress along alternative dimensions of performance, it must develop a new set of core 
activities. That is, the firm needs not only to carry out new activities, but also to reconfigure the 
existing interdependence among the old.   
We argue in the second section that a high-performing firm will almost always find it 
extremely hard to alter this nexus of interdependence because such a change conflicts with the 
structural context, or the formal organization and systems, that top management has previously 
established to promote certain managerial behaviors throughout the company (Bower, 1970). In 
addition, because managers at the lower level have been accustomed to interacting within the 
current structural constraints, a stable pattern of interaction, as part of the informal organization, 
establishes itself across levels and functions. The peculiarities in collective behaviors thus 
sometimes remain even after the formal structure has changed. Because the resource allocation 
resulting in firm activities is essentially a bottom-up process that is deeply embedded in the 
operating level of the company, the existing core activities are often preserved by these formal 
and informal structures. Under normal circumstances, managers are motivated to define and  
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select only initiatives that reinforce the current performance dimensions of the firm. Even when 
top management directly allocates resources for new activities that explicitly target alternative 
dimensions of performance, operating managers are still habituated to continue the existing core 
activities and tend to consider the new activities peripheral and treat them accordingly.   
Our analysis of this resistance leads us to conclude in the third section that highly specific 
intervention is particularly important when top managers attempt to alter the firm’s performance 
trajectory along new dimensions. Because of the unsuitable behaviors that stem from the 
collective dynamics among individuals, there are times that top management needs to intervene. 
We argue that a deep dive is an effective means to translate a strategic intent envisioned by top 
managers into organized actions that will be embraced by multiple levels of the organization. 
When top management defines and selects the technical objectives of a strategic initiative, 
structural constraints of the organization can be ignored or bypassed. The positional power of a 
very high level executive can ensure a complete implementation of the strategic initiative, 
thereby facilitating the emergence of a new pattern of interaction among operating managers. 
Unintended distortion by lower-level managers can be minimized. We include a graphic 
representation of a process model (see Figure 3) of this kind of top management intervention, 
making explicit those aspects of intervention that are unique to a deep dive. 
In the final section, we illustrate the power of a deep dive with a case study.
8 The  story 
of a corporate project at ASUSTek, a major Taiwanese IT company, demonstrates how top 
management can drive the company to shift its performance dimensions by directly establishing 
the substantive content of a project initiative rather than indirectly influencing the substance 
through the framing of a vision or rearrangement of structural context. Overall, we seek to 
                                                            
8  In this paper, the conceptual argument is deduced through a thorough review of the prior literature. The case here 
serves only an additional justification and allows readers to see how our theoretical constructs operate in real life. 
See Siggelkow (2007) for a detailed explanation of this presentation approach.        
  
9 
develop a theory that explains this case and others we have observed. The core contribution of 
this paper is to identify a managerial mechanism by which a top management can overcome 
powerful organizational forces that ordinarily block the implementation of critical shifts in 
strategic direction.   
 
CORE ACTIVITES, STRATEGY, AND STRUCTURAL CONTEXT 
The Firm as a System of Activities   
  Scholars have long recognized that firms exist to perform coordinated activities (Coase, 
1937). But before we examine the nature of these activities – their interdependencies and 
limitations – we need first to clarify our terminology.     
Some basic definitions. We use the term firm activities to refer to coordinated actions 
undertaken by the firm along its value chain (Porter, 1985). Examples include processing orders, 
calling on customers, assembling products, and training employees. For these activities to be 
sustainable, their cost – including the cost of capital invested in the means of production – must 
be repaid by the revenue generated at sales. A firm thus requires a strategy that translates its 
mission and purpose into choices of products and markets, and also policies and programs to 
carry out the activities needed to satisfy the firm’s economic requirements (Andrews, 1971).   
These fine-grained levels of firm activities are grouped in corporate functions as research 
and development, marketing, finance, manufacturing, and distribution. Expressed in this way, the 
nature of a firm’s activities is grounded at the level of organizational routines – a recurring 
performance of recognizable patterns of sequential or reciprocal actions across multiple parties 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). The need for managers to coordinate and communicate regularly 
indicates the interdependence among firm activities (Thompson, 1967).      
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The activities of a firm, either fine grained or grouped as functions, are formally 
governed by the structural context, which encompasses the formal designs of the organization 
and the various formal administrative mechanisms that define “rules of the game” among 
managers across levels and functions (Bower, 1970). Structural context includes organizational 
architecture, role definitions, written rules and procedures, information and measurement 
systems, and reward and punishment systems. These formal arrangements are intended to ensure 
managers will behave in ways calculated to achieve desired objectives, in control arrangements 
that evaluate performance and detect deviance, in reward systems that motivate managers to 
carry out prescribed tasks, and in the set of criteria by which managers are selected, replaced, 
and promoted. Although structural context by itself does not account for all organized actions, it 
exercises a strong influence on how a firm conducts its activities.   
Interdependence among firm activities. When two elements are interdependent, the 
value of one element depends on the presence of the other (Simon, 1962; Levinthal, 1997). At 
the level of firm activities, when two activities are complementary or reinforce each other, the 
marginal value of engaging in each rises with the presence of the other (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990 and 1995). To attain high performance, a firm must perform activities in ways that will 
complement each other. Porter (1996) reports the way complementarities among firm activities 
at Southwest Airlines, IKEA, (and the Vanguard Group – see below) help these companies to 
achieve extraordinary returns.   
Limitations of firm activities. As a successful firm grows, the scope of firm activities 
expands (Chandler, 1977; Penrose, 1959). With the system of activities moving towards a higher 
level of complexity, it is possible to identify some activities as core because they possess higher 
interdependence or connectedness (Hannan, Burton, and Baron, 1996). These core activities  
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become critical for fulfilling the basic aspects of the realized strategy of the firm, but at the same 
time, limit the areas in which the firm is capable of improving in the future. An example of how 
core activities emerge and become more complex is provided in Siggelkow’s (2002) longitudinal 
study of the Vanguard Group. Its strategy was the provision of mutual funds at a low cost. As 
Vanguard continued to develop conservatively managed funds, the product development activity 
was gradually reinforced by new complementary activities, such as in-house distribution, which 
helped reduce management fees, and extensive customer communication, which fostered the 
preference for long-term investment among buyers. Together, these activities permitted the firm 
to pursue the low-cost strategy more effectively. However, activities that were less important to 
this realized strategy stayed peripheral or faced elimination. For instance, Vanguard decreased its 
advertising as a percentage of managed assets over time. The company also terminated its client 
brokerage service, as brokers only made profits from frequent transactions by customers. In other 
words, as Vanguard successfully implemented the original vision of its founder by elaborating its 
strategy consistently, the core activities of the firm also evolved in a coherent direction, resulting 
in a trajectory of performance improvement in product attributes that is very different from that 
of a traditional mutual fund provider. Because of the limited resources for consistent investments 
in new areas, the management team at Vanguard had to accept, implicitly, that at any point in 
time, the company could make meaningful progress only along certain dimensions of 
performance – the provision of low cost, convenient, and long-term oriented services (Adner and 
Levinthal, 2008). They were constrained as a direct result of the interdependence that had been 





The Need for Reconfiguration of Firm Activities   
  Because all firms operate in a changing environment, a firm needs, over time, to adjust its 
system of activities. Yet, as we have just seen, an established company often experiences great 
difficulty if it needs to reorient its core activities in order to achieve major progress along new 
dimensions of performance (Adner and Levinthal, 2008).         
An environmental change. A shift in the environment, such as a change in technology or 
consumer taste, may not only cause a firm’s strategy to become inappropriate, but also render 
core activities of the firm inadequate against new competitors (e.g., Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Rosenbloom, 2000; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gilbert, 2005; Taylor and Helfat, 2009). Previous 
dimensions of performance along which the firm has been making progress later become less 
relevant in the new environment. The phenomenon of disruptive technology is a classic example 
of this kind of environmental change. A disruptive technology under-performs initially on 
dimensions that are valued by key customers and represent key strengths of incumbent firms 
(Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Adner, 2002; Gilbert, 2005). While dominant 
customers may find early versions of disruptive products inadequate to their needs, the new 
product technologies may be cheaper, simpler, smaller, or easier to use and hence very attractive 
to new customer segments. In order to develop strategies for serving the low-end or new-market 
segments, new entrants develop activity systems that depart significantly from those of industry 
incumbents (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Christensen, 2006). Because the core activities of 
the entrants deliver performance improvement in product attributes along alternative dimensions, 
incumbent firms find that their core activities are ineffective to halt the continuing assaults from 
these new competitors. Disruption of the incumbents occurs when subsequent development of  
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the disruptive technology raises the performance enough along traditional dimensions important 
to mainstream customers to satisfy their needs. At that point, incumbents typically exit.   
Difficulty in reconfiguring activities. The case of disruptive technology illustrates a 
particular situation where firms experience great difficulties in pursuing a new strategy that 
entails a change in dimensions of performance. But more generally, whenever a firm attempts to 
modify its core activities in order to progress along new performance dimensions, it needs not 
only to perform new activities but also to alter the pattern of interdependence among the old.   
The general idea of a firm shifting its performance trajectory into and along new 
dimensions is illustrated in Figure 1, which features performance improvements along two 
distinct dimensions (P and P’) across time. In this simplified example, the firm progresses only 
along dimension P between time t0 and t1, resulting in performance improvement ΔP(t1- t0). 
During the next period between t1 and t2, the firm achieves performance improvement ΔP’(t2- t1) 
along the new dimension P’ and thus shifts its performance trajectory entirely. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Interestingly, well-established organizations often fail to shift their performance 
trajectories into new dimensions because they are unable to reconfigure the existing relationships 
among their core activities. This can happen even when these firms are already performing the 
new activities as a peripheral extension
9  (e.g., Henderson and Clark, 1990; Sull, 1999; Tripsas 
and Gavetti, 2000; Burgelman, 2002).
 The dilemma, which top management faces when it 
                                                            
9  At times, new activities of an established firm may be developed to a highly sophisticated level but the 
organization still treats them as peripheral. Despite the resources made available by top management for new 
activities, the firm, in this case, still fail to realize a strategic change. An example of such failure can be found in 
Xerox's foray into personal computing. While the company was the first to perfect the entire system of a modern PC, 
it could not capture its commercial potential and was sidelined eventually by late entrants such as IBM and Apple. 
See Douglas K. Smith and Robert C. Alexander, Fumbling the Future (New York: William Morrow, 1988).  
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attempts to alter the parameters of multiple activities, balloons into an exceedingly complex 
situation that is similar to an “intractable” algorithmic problem because of the underlying 
interdependence among firm activities (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000). The cognitive 
complexity involved when a firm alters its core activities may far exceed the information-
processing power of any top managers.           
 
STRATEGY PROCESS 
The Emergent Nature of Strategic Change 
The goal of this paper is to present a new theory of organizational change that retains the 
valuable insights of prior work while enabling us to account for the empirical observations 
(described in the introduction) that are poorly explained by that work. In particular, we show that 
for an established firm that seeks to make major progress along new dimensions of performance 
(as illustrated in Figure 1), relying on structural solutions alone is indirect, uncertain, and 
potentially ineffective. Instead, as an alternative approach, top management ought to intervene 
proactively by defining and selecting detailed objectives of specific project initiatives, and then 
directly manage their executions. To understand the logic of this basic proposition, it is helpful 
first to examine the way strategic changes typically occur in a large organization so that the 
difference is clear. This general strategy process, as it occurs under normal circumstances, is 
presented in Figure 2.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
The standard process of strategic change. Previous strategy process researchers such as 
Bower (1970), Quinn (1978), Pettigrew (1985), Mintzberg and McHugh (1985), Burgelman  
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(1991), and Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) have convincingly demonstrated the emergent nature of a 
realized strategy. This implies that any successful shift in dimensions of performance by a large 
organization is rarely decided by just a few executives at the top. Rather, intensive field studies 
reveal that the realized strategy of a firm is actually determined by the cumulative result of a 
series of decisions on resource allocation that ultimately lead to concrete activities of the firm 
(relationship ‘D1’ in the process model depicted in Figure 2; for a recent review on the body of 
work on the resource allocation process, see Bower and Gilbert, 2005). Under most 
circumstances, detailed specifics of a strategic commitment are defined by operating managers in 
response to discrepancies between what they are currently achieving and what they have been 
asked to achieve or believe they can achieve.
10  In other words, the specifics of a project proposal 
deal with dimensions of a problem that a manager faces in his/her assigned roles. Proposals are 
championed in order to resolve those problems. After initiation, promising proposals require 
further impetus from general managers in the middle. Their decisions as to which initiatives to 
select and which to ignore are usually determining as to what get funded. Sponsorship and then 
the pattern of execution determine what actually happens, not words on paper. Before an 
initiative is committed at the corporate level in the form of a formal approval, the multi-level 
process of selection has already occurred. The realized strategy is thus fundamentally determined 
by the definition and selection processes deep in the operating levels of the firm (‘C1’ and ‘C2’ 
in Figure 2). As top management does not possess adequate knowledge and information to 
evaluate the technical aspects of every project proposal, its role in strategic change is primarily to 
be “willing enough to recognize strategically bottom-up initiatives and capitalize on them rather 
than pass them by” (Noda and Bower, 1996, p.188). The major source of top management’s 
                                                            
10  This observation on problemistic search by lower-level managers is consistent with the Carnegie school problem-
solving perspective (Simon, 1945; Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1965).  
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power is in its control over the structural context of the company in promoting the appropriate 
decisions and actions of lower-level managers. It is the structural context that determines the 
technical content developed by operating managers and the decision to provide support for 
projects made by general managers in the middle (‘B1’ in Figure 2). Coordination among 
different parties inside a company is also made possible as individuals are presented with limited 
alternatives and circumscribed choices.   
No top management, however, is far-seeing enough to be able to anticipate all the 
possible contingencies that might confront each position in the organization. Rules and policies 
are never sufficient to fully specify the details of individual behavior, because the interpretation 
of any rule always requires additional judgment and general rules are designed to be applicable 
across multiple situations that a manager may encounter (Zimmerman, 1970; Giddens, 1984). 
Even if it were possible, to attempt to program every individual behavior under every single 
situation would curtail individuals' problem-solving and undermine individuals' initiatives, a 
dangerous practice that would lead to inflexibility in times of change (Ashby, 1952). In addition, 
all managers have vested interests in the success of the working units to which they belong. As 
their units can be sources of power, prestige and pleasure, individuals want to see their units be 
protected and, if possible, strengthened (Pfeffer, 1981). Therefore, structural context alone 
cannot completely account for the pattern of interaction that emerges over time and space among 
managers across functions and levels. 
How patterns of interaction emerge from the structural context itself. As situated 
managers repeatedly interact within the environment provided by the structural context of the 
firm, a stable pattern of interaction develops and becomes part of the informal organization that 
will eventually emerge among the managers (‘B2’ in Figure 2). The characteristics of the  
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informal organization are shaped by the frequency and duration of contacts between individuals, 
the tendency to initiate these contacts, the direction of influence between persons, and the degree 
of cooperation (Homans, 1950; Merton, 1957; Blau and Scott, 1962). Over time, behavioral 
norms and communication patterns come to reflect and govern the power distribution and 
differential status among subunits (Barley, 1986).   
This process where the structural context of the firm shapes and is inextricably shaped by 
the intertwined characteristics of the interactive pattern among managers was observed by 
evolutionary economists in the context of organizational routines, confirming the prevalence of 
such social phenomena. Nelson and Winter (1982) argued that organizational routines impose a 
truce on intra-organizational conflicts. That is, despite their privately held and potentially hostile 
attitudes towards one another, managers across functions simply agree to go on and interact over 
coordinated activities. Routines, as an agreement about how to do the work, suppress conflicts. 
Yet the exercise of organizational routines itself reinforces the existing power relationships 
among those subunits (Dosi, Levinthal and Marengo, 2003). In this way, individuals learn the 
working norms and agreed priorities of the organization through the recurrent execution of 
organizational routines. 
This emergent, reflexive and yet unwritten pattern of interaction is crucial to future 
organized actions. It increases the ease of communication, facilitates coordination, and supplants 
any inadequacies of the structural context whenever it cannot fully specify the appropriate 
responses a priori (Gross, 1953; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988). Without a stable pattern of 
interaction among managers, an organization can easily sink into chaos every time an 
entrepreneurial manager engages in innovative activities because coordination among multiple 
parties becomes impossible in the newfound situation (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). For an  
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individual to violate the behavioral norms – the mutual expectation concerning how different 
parties ought to behave – espoused by the current pattern of interaction is to risk organizational 
sanctions (Pfeffer, 1981). Because of their intentional actions, situated actors, knowingly or 
unknowingly, reproduce and extend the existing properties of the structural context whenever 
they interact (Giddens, 1984). Unless there is an exogenous intervention, the existing 
interdependence among firm activities in a high performing company perpetuates across time 
and strategic domain (‘D2’ in Figure 2). 
 
THE NEED FOR TOP-DOWN INTERVENTION 
An Analysis of Four Scenarios 
An extensive body of research has established the way in which emergent strategy is the 
consequence of resource allocation.
11  Having examined the emergent nature of strategic changes 
in the previous section, we now investigate the resource allocation process under four different 
situations: 1) a conventional bottom-up process; 2) a bottom-up process coupled with 
autonomous activities at the lower level; 3) a top-down allocation of resources; and 4) a top-
down intervention in the form of a deep dive. By analyzing how a strategic initiative unfolds at 
the stage of project definition and project selection (‘C1’ and ‘C2’ in Figure 2) as well as its 
subsequent implementation that leads to firm activities (‘D1’ and ‘D2’ in Figure 2), we highlight 
how a deep dive help shift a firm's performance dimensions with a greater degree of certainty 
(‘E’ in Figure 2).   
Why bottom-up innovation fails to result in a shift in performance dimensions. The 
organizational literature has long proved the importance of achieving an internal fit between 
                                                            
11  From Resource Allocation to Strategy, (Joseph L. Bower and Clark Gilbert, Oxford University Press, 2007) 
provides a summary of this literature.  
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structure and strategy (Chandler, 1962; Learned, Christensen, Andrews, and Guth, 1965; 
Khandwalla, 1973; Miles and Snow, 1978; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). Assuming the 
presence of a strategic fit with its external environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Pennings, 
1987), an organization is driven to develop a structural context that reinforces its official strategy 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Nadler and Tushman, 1992; Siggelkow 2001). The structural 
context of a high performing firm therefore has a tendency to become more complex and aligned 
with its official strategy over time (Siggelkow, 2002). Even when top management subsequently 
initiates a strategic reorientation in which the organization experiences an episodic revolution 
(Miller and Friesen, 1984; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985), major changes in organizational 
structure, systems and rewards need to be implemented and legitimated before changes in 
business strategy can begin to emerge (Pettigrew,1987). Thus, during the long periods of stability 
between reorientations of strategy, the current structural context strongly influences how a 
manager perceives business problems, by directing, delimiting, and coloring his/her focus and 
attention (Bower, 1970; Ocasio, 1997). The conventional bottom-up process of definition and 
selection will result in elaboration of firm activities that support the current strategy of the firm. 
Consequently, the existing interdependence among firm activities stays intact. Core activities of 
the firm remain unchanged and the current dimensions of performance persist.       
Why entrepreneurial managers at the lower level may fail to push for a shift in 
performance dimensions. Research has shown that in response to shifts in technology and the 
market, mid-level general managers may engage in what Burgelman (1983 a) called an 
autonomous strategic behavior. This involves entrepreneurial activities that fall outside the 
current scope of the explicit strategy (Kanter, 1982; Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985). Big, 
resource-rich organizations usually possess enough slack to tolerate such experimentation at the  
  
20 
operational levels (Burgelman, 1983b). However, once a promising strategic initiative grows 
large and its resource requirement exceeds what individual supporters can provide at the local 
level, the initiative will then enter a highly political process of strategic context determination 
(Burgelman, 1983c and 1991). This is where entrepreneurial managers need to convince top 
management that the current strategy needs to be changed so as to accommodate the ongoing 
business development stemming from the new strategic initiative. In delineating concrete terms 
of the new business development that lies outside the current scope of the official strategy, 
managers who compete for corporate resources inevitably engage in a framing contest – an 
attempt to recast their proposals in ways that will resonate with a larger audience in the 
organization and mobilize actions in the projects' favor (Goffman, 1974; Kaplan, 2008). 
Entrepreneurial managers thus race to recast their project benefits along already-legitimated 
dimensions of performance (Adner and Levinthal, 2008).   
Burgelman's (1991) discussion of Intel's venture into Reduced Instruction Set Computing 
(RISC), an initiative that competed for development resources with the official strategy of 
Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC), provides an example of managers recasting project 
benefits along existing performance dimensions so that other parts of the organization could 
recognize them. After different project proposals filter up the managerial hierarchy, top 
management is left ex-post to ratify strategic initiatives that have already been made to conform 
with the legitimate dimensions of firm performance, even if these strategic initiatives would lead 
to business development in new fields. Since any project benefits residing on new dimensions 
were considered secondary when the initiative was still gathering momentum at the lower-level, 
new activities are treated as peripheral by the rest of the organization. The existing relationships 
among a firm's core activities dominate.    
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Again at Intel, the adherence of the production rule around its manufacturing engineering, 
maximize-margin-per-wafer-start, over both periods when the company was selling memory 
chips and later microprocessor, is a powerful example of how core activities of a firm can persist 
even after a complete shift in product-market strategy (Burgelman, 1994). But even more 
commonly observed, the internal selection environment within the firm simply grows to become 
so rigid that only those strategic initiatives that explicitly match with the firm’s existing core 
activities would prevail (Burgelman, 2002; Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Why re-allocation of resources by top management fails to result in a shift in 
performance dimensions. Within the archetypal resource allocation process of a large firm, top 
management is too remote to observe capacity shortages in production or quality deficiencies in 
finished products that would propel them to initiate project proposals to resolve those operating 
issues. However, when compared to operating managers, top management does have access to a 
greater range of information, both internally and externally (Burt, 1992 and 1997) and is 
therefore more likely to observe changes in the external environment outside the firm's existing 
customers or activity sets. In addition, with advances in information and control systems that 
make possible flatter organizations nowadays, general managers in the middle are likely to 
discuss their business strategies with top management with higher frequency than in the past 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Guided by market insights, top management sometimes bypasses the bottom-
up process of resource allocation entirely and directly provides resources for new activities that 
target new dimensions of performance. Gilbert's (2005) study of newspaper organizations' 
response to the emergence of digital media documented aggressive top-down resource 
commitment made by leaders of industry incumbents to new technologies responding to their 
fear of potential competition from online news.    
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The problem with even radical top down interventions of this sort is that unless all of the 
related activities necessary for the new business are completely independent of the rest of the 
organization, these new activities will of necessity still interact with the old activity system.
12 
This situation is most commonly encountered when a company pursues a product market 
opportunity that lies beyond the current capability of any single division (Burgelman and Doz, 
2001; Burgelman and Grove, 2007; Kleinbaum and Tushman, 2007). Before the organizational 
boundary for the new strategic initiative can be clearly delineated, resources from existing 
divisions are recombined on a trial-and-error, ad-hoc basis to support the new activity set during 
the early stage of implementation (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003).   
However, when an operating manager who belongs to the old activity system is asked to 
carry out specific tasks for the sake of the new strategic initiative, he/she is still bounded by the 
existing structural context at the local level. To this operating manager, deviating from existing 
policies and standard procedures makes little sense from the local perspective. To begin, his/her 
structural position renders a very different attention structure (March and Olsen, 1976; Ocasio 
1997), the idea may simply appear foolish. But even if the idea appears sensible, the risk and 
reward trade-off looks unattractive when he/she attempts to align current activities along those 
new performance dimensions. Further, in cases where the required adjustments fall outside the 
boundaries of the existing structural context, the operating manager will still seek a solution that 
appears to be the most appropriate and legitimate given the existing context. Inevitably, he/she 
will again fall back onto the existing pattern of interaction with which managers across functions 
are most familiar. Existing working norms and agreed priorities of the organization prevail. As a 
result, even when the old and the new operating divisions develop new linkages to share and 
                                                            
12  In Gilbert’s (2005) study, for example, sale of advertising for the online news operation was the responsibility of 
the same sales organization that handled print.  
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transfer resources, the interdependence within the old activity system at the level of 
organizational routines remains intact, an interdependence developed to optimize performance 
on previous dimensions. Therefore, forced resource allocation alone will only result in new 
activities that stay peripheral relative to the other existing core activities of the firm.   
Moreover, resource allocation is not a one-time event but an iterative process (Noda and 
Bower, 1996). It is critical to generate early results that are assessed as successful in the sense 
that they meet the targets forecasted in the initial proposals. Subsequent resource allocation 
depends upon the way initial results are measured and they must generate enough impetus within 
the organization to secure further cooperation for the strategic initiative across the company in 
future moves. However, if a company implements its project under the makeshift combination of 
the old core and new activities, the business result is almost guaranteed to be suboptimal on 
those new dimensions that the top management has originally envisioned (Levinthal, 1997; 
Adner and Levinthal, 2008). In the subsequent process of resource allocation, because of the 
unfavorable result, the initiative will suffer de-escalation in commitment during the next rounds 
of review. New activities will therefore be denied ongoing resource funding. Alternatively, 
lower-level managers will have to scramble to retrofit new activities as peripheral support for 
core activities of the firm. Again, previous dimensions of firm performance persist.   
    Top-down intervention in the form of a deep dive.    The image of top management 
presented in the previous paragraphs is of a management team that is much removed from the 
day-to-day operational realities of the organization. A chief executive works primarily as an 
organizational architect, designing and building a structural context that will induce appropriate 
organized actions across all ranks within the company. But once that context has been put in 
place, the operation almost takes on a life of its own. The activities of the organization persist as  
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long as they remain a successful approach to the chosen strategic domain. Without some yet-to-
be described intervention, the workings of the formal and informal organization render the 
possibilities of a shift in performance trajectory (as summarized in Figure 2) exceedingly 
complex and indirect, and filled with numerous possibilities for failures.       
    In contrast, in the opening example of Apple, we saw Steve Jobs demand specific product 
features and project targets when the company was designing its music-playing devices. As the 
initiative continued to unfold, he stayed close to the project team, and personally persuaded 
major record labels to supply Apple with music content online. We call this kind of top-down 
intervention – when a top manager of an established firm is closely involved in the definition and 
selection of a strategic initiative and maintains a strong presence throughout its implementation – 
a deep dive. A deep dive represents an alternative approach to managing that enables top leaders 
to overcome organizational barriers and to shift an established firm’s performance dimensions 
with a greater degree of certainty. This idea is illustrated in the process model depicted in Figure 
3.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
    In concept, a deep dive overrides whatever obstacles are imposed by particular aspects of 
the structural context and informal organization that might delay or distort progress or learning 
along the new performance dimensions. The argument involves several steps. Because 
information flows inside a firm are widely diffused, an original business idea does not need to be 
conceived at the corporate level. Yet, only top management is in the position to circumvent 
entirely the existing structural context and to define and execute a radical strategic initiative, an 
initiative that explicitly targets new performance dimensions, and, at the same time, implies  
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significant resource commitments (step ‘1’ in the process model depicted in Figure 3). When a 
strategic initiative of this nature is initiated by top management, it bypasses the bottom-up 
process of resource allocation by expressing a corporate performance aspiration in terms of 
concrete technical specifics. Since the strategic initiative is simultaneously championed, 
sponsored, and committed at the highest level, this selection process bypasses or ignores 
operating and mid-level managers, managers who are perennially conditioned to reframe any 
non-conforming aspects of a major initiative back into previously-legitimated dimensions. As a 
result, the original definition of the strategic initiative is protected (step ‘2’ in Figure 3). An 
imposed performance aspiration is officially expressed in the project’s substantive specificities.   
    This kind of project definition forces the responsible project team to forgo previous 
problem-solving routines that would prove it impossible or unattractive to achieve the aspired 
level of performance along the new dimensions. The discrepancy between the imposed level of 
aspiration and the current level of achievement, as a new performance gap, creates large enough 
dissatisfaction that induces the project team to engage in distant search activities. Along with the 
additional resources that have already been made available by top management, the new 
performance gap frees the project team from past performance history of the firm when it looks 
for technical solutions as well as other non-financial resources outside the organization (c.f., 
Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 1981). 
    The strong presence of a top manager with high positional power insures that the new 
activities are no longer driven to the periphery of the operating organization (step ‘3’ in Figure 
3). Lower-level managers who belong to other parts of the organization are now willing to 
circumvent local policies and forgo existing routines in order to align their activities with the  
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strategic initiative. In other words, the current structural context of the company is bypassed over 
the stages of project definition, project selection, and project implementation.   
  But  more  importantly,  the  continuous impetus provided by the top manager in fulfilling 
the original project definition supersedes the existing patterns of interaction among managers 
within the firm. Even when an operating manager outside the project team encounters a 
coordination problem that occurs beyond the boundaries of what the current structural context is 
designed to control (i.e., within a grey area), his/her priority is now switched towards the 
strategic initiative. Because the strategic initiative provides legitimacy for potential new 
arrangements, lower-level managers cease to automatically re-enact the previous pattern of 
interaction and falling back onto the previous working norms immediately. In their attempt to 
resolve the coordination problem as well as to meet all the technical requirements stipulated by 
the strategic initiative, managers across functions are forced to first make sense of the newfound 
situation and to reduce their reliance on any automatic processing – a suppression behavioral 
norms that stem from the existing informal organization – so as to develop a novel response to 
that situation. In effect, the organization engages in ad-hoc problem-solving across multiple 
levels all the way into the phase of implementation and stops exercising existing repertories of 
performance programs that restrict or simplify information-processing. A forward-looking logic 
of consequence replaces the experience-based logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989; 
Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). As individual actors are able to experience new ways of 
interacting, it creates the opportunity to dislodge the existing communication pattern, power 
distribution, and social status among subunits (step ‘4’ in Figure 3). A new pattern of interaction 
among managers thus begins to emerge.    
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    Compared to the previous scenario where top management is only responsible for 
reallocating resources, a deep dive provides a way to insure that organized actions across 
functions and levels are aligned with the strategic initiative. Therefore, the company stands a 
better chance to achieve performance success along new dimensions that top management has 
originally envisioned (step ‘5’ in Figure 3). During the next rounds of review, the risk of 
strategic de-escalation due to distorted implementation is greatly mitigated. In short, a deep dive 
minimizes unintended distortion at implementation by gearing the collective actions of the firm 
towards the new performance dimensions as much as possible. Following up on early successes, 
top management can then seize the opportunity to remap the current structural context to reflect 
new behaviors that are required to sustain the momentum. By institutionalizing these behavioral 
changes through formal administrative mechanisms, top managers are again released from the 
burden of continuous involvement in operational details.
13  A deep dive can therefore be viewed 
as a unique change mechanism by which top management intervenes at the project level but 
produces system-wide changes at the firm level. 
 
AN EMPIRCAL EXAMPLE 
We illustrate the power of a deep dive by considering what happened when the 
management team at ASUSTek sought to develop a new set of core activities that would enable 
the company to compete along new dimensions of performance. ASUSTek Computer Inc. was 
the world’s largest manufacturer of PC motherboards. A Fortune Global 500 company, with 
USD 17.2 billion in revenue by 2007, its second largest business, after motherboards, was 
                                                            
13  Note that a deep dive allows the possibility of inducing changes in the informal organization of the firm before 
reinforcing the desired behaviors through the elements of formal organization – a reverse order of changes that 
underpins the majority literature on organizational design.      
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notebook computers. In terms of notebook shipment volume, ASUSTek ranked fifth globally, 
surpassing Lenovo, Apple and Sony.   
 
Taiwan’s Computing Industry 
  Historically, the notebook industry had been dominated by two distinct business 
strategies: 1) contract manufacturers that fulfill OEM orders made by international IT companies 
from the West, and 2) own-brand manufacturers that build and market their products around the 
world. Although these two types of companies were essentially competing within the same 
product space, they were easily distinguished by how firm activities were organized. For 
example, a contract manufacturer competed through the provision of top-of-the-line client 
services. It raced to bring finished products to consumer markets quickly by fulfilling product 
concepts developed by their client companies. Tight quality controls, rigorous manufacturing 
disciplines, fast and standardized assembly processes, and short production cycle times were the 
typical attributes of firm activities at a contract manufacturer. These specific emphases were 
driven and controlled by extensive elements embedded in the structural context of the 
organization. The design, development, and production processes were often highly codified, 
divided by standardized deliverables and review gates to pass before proceeding to the next 
phase in the product development cycles. These rigorous review processes served as a formal 
mechanism for both collaboration and information sharing among subunits inside the firm. In 
addition, working norms that centered around manufacturing and engineering functions gave 
organizational priorities to manufacturing disciplines, which in turn enabled a contract 
manufacturer to maximize the utilization of production capacities as a whole and to minimize 
surprises in product delivery – both abilities critical to the long-term success of the firm.  
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In contrast to a contract manufacturer that relied on product roadmaps provided by its 
customers, a major focus of an own-brand manufacturer was the crafting of a product strategy 
balances market demands and technology trends. Marketing a line of branded products 
internationally required the appreciation of the nuances of local markets around the world which 
in turn required the development of marketing, distribution, and support capabilities in each 
market. In addition, to effectively perform upstream activities required for product strategy and 
conceptual design, downstream functions such as sales and distribution played a critical role in 
gathering market information on potential product concepts, prevailing quality standards, and 
optimal price points.   
In short, because contract manufacturers and own-brand manufacturers were targeting 
two very different sets of customers, firm activities were geared towards delivering different two 
types of value propositions, associated with two competitive arenas. Figure 4 summarizes these 
differences and highlights how the performance dimensions differ across these two types of 
firms. The lists show dramatically that, an organizational form is essentially the “physical” 
embodiment of the actual strategy that a firm is currently pursuing, focusing the firm so that it 
can optimize its activities along chosen dimensions of performance. An obviously visible 
consequence suggested by these two lists is that it will be very difficult for a firm to shift its 
performance trajectory along new dimensions.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
A changing environment. With the increasingly tight link between Intel and Microsoft 
Windows, the standardization of hardware and software drove the personal computing industry 
to become strongly price sensitive at comparable levels of quality. Further, several mega-mergers  
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(e.g., HP-Compaq, Acer-Gateway-eMachines, Lenovo-IBM) substantially increased the industry 
concentration among a few international IT companies. They were then able to exercise greater 
buyer power when outsourcing physical product development and manufacturing to Taiwan for 
cost advantages. As a result, valued-added activities continued to shift away from product 
assembly to sales and distribution, as well as brand management. The constant decline in average 
unit price of a PC forced many Taiwanese contract manufacturers to struggle to maintain profit 
margins even above five percent. Figure 5 illustrates the erosion of margins over time. The 
chronic decline in profitability of the industry became so severe that the Taiwanese government 
launched a USD 50 million program in 2005, designed to cultivate an environment that was 
conducive to branding.
14  Brand building was seen as part of the social responsibility for the 
country.
15  Industry veterans also likened the PC industry to the automobile industry where “style 
trumped durability.”
16        
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
A Deep Dive at ASUSTek 
  By the early 2000s, before the deep dive occurred, ASUSTek had successfully built a 
large contract manufacturing operation in serving international IT companies. Its major clients 
included HP, Dell, Toshiba and Sony. Electronic and mechanical engineers at ASUSTek took 
pride in solving technical problems, and they were deeply familiar with leading-edge 
manufacturing disciplines. Elaborate control policies ensured that every computer made by the 
company was of the highest quality. Just like any other successful contract manufacturers, 
ASUSTek excelled in the realms of manufacturing compliance, production efficiency, and 
                                                            
14  News Release by the Taiwan External Trade Development Council on November 20, 2007. 
15  Taipei Times, October 06, 2008, Acer head stresses branding at Taipei business seminar. 
16  CommonWealth Magazine, August 15, 2003, pp. 180-183.    
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technological development, but were slow to grasp changes in consumer tastes, social values, 
and market trends. At times, products that were exclusively designed and marketed by ASUSTek 
appeared to lack a sense for the colors, lines, and curves that would appeal to consumers. 
The first notebook marketed under the ASUS brand was black, bulky, weighed a hefty 
8.6 pounds, and was costly. Only 2,000 units were sold. Disappointed by the result, the top 
management set up an internal industrial design team in 1998. Along with consistent investments 
over the years, the department garnered numerous international awards. Co-founder and vice 
chairman T H Tung often told CEO Jonney Shih that “no limit, no trade off” should be made in 
the hiring decision for the best designers. Although ASUSTek management was clear about its 
desire to translate design award winners into consumer “hot” products, it was frustrated by its 
lack of progress. Rather than being integrated into the product development process, the 
industrial design team was often treated as a peripheral function in the company. The vision of 
marketing and distributing notebooks that would resemble fashion accessories under the ASUS 
brand had not been realized. 
In 2005, Tung initiated a corporate project using genuine leather as the cover material for 
the new notebook model (step ‘1’ in Figure 3).
17  A thermal insulator, leather created an 
engineering challenge for heat dispersion and processor stability. As every piece of leather was 
handpicked and embossed onto the metal body, the production process was protracted and very 
costly. Championed by Tung himself, the project was handed over to the notebook business unit 
only after the completion of prototyping (step ‘2’ in Figure 3). According to a specialist at the 
industrial design department:     
Everyone at the company felt the urgency to differentiate ourselves through better designs. The notebook 
business unit at the time was looking at color-anodized aluminum casing as the next big thing. But T H was 
                                                            
17  In this particular case, instead of CEO Shih, it was vice chairman Tung who undertook the deep dive.    
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so convinced we needed something even bigger and he picked leather. We were shocked! For sure, the 
production approach was uncertain but the market potential was also uncertain. Well, we knew nothing 
about leather and so we just had to go out to find handbag makers and learned!   
Another manager at the corporate planning department also observed:   
Honestly speaking, this leather casing concept is not something everyone can do. Because most junior PMs 
[product managers] only listen to Sales, and they influenced so much in the process, we would end up 
putting in features that are already available in the market.   
It took ASUSTek over one year to perfect the leather bonding procedure before mass 
production was feasible. Rigorous requirements related to humidity, sweat, cosmetics, and oil 
resistance pushed the industrial design team to interact with the other units of the company at an 
unprecedented level (step ‘3’ in Figure 3). In this project, Tung not only secured the necessary 
resources allocated to the department, but he also shaped the norms of product development 
across the whole company by putting the industrial design team in charge early on. Since the 
new design radically departed from those based on aluminum, steel, and plastic, the project 
resulted in numerous adjustments of existing policies among various departments. Again, 
according to the specialist at the industrial design department:   
After people [outside the industrial design department] saw the prototype, they realized T H was actually 
serious and this leather project had to get done. Of course, we designers needed to keep pushing and I got 
involved into so many things that weren’t really my job… I used to work mostly with mechanical engineers 
but this project really got those quality people to change a lot. They built a completely new matrix for 
product evaluation because leather was so different from all the other materials that we had worked 
before… The hardest part was the actual manufacturing. So many parties were involved and so many 
unforeseen problems popped up. 
  Achieving the required new relationship among design innovation, engineering 
perfection, and manufacturing discipline placed tremendous pressure on the top management 
team. Even CEO Shih confessed that the balancing acts “tired him out.” Still, spearheaded by  
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Tung, new communication patterns and procedural norms across divisions eventually emerge 
(step ‘4’ in Figure 3). In 2006, the company successfully released a notebook computer with a 
light aluminum casing and leather inlay aimed at high-end customers.   
Case study debrief. ASUSTek is an example of a company seeking to build a set of new 
core activities in response to the changing environment. Sensing that its core technologies were 
gradually maturing, ASUSTek systematically invested in its industrial design team in order to 
develop new capabilities. Concept models were built and the company accumulated industry 
awards. However, the transformation from an engineering-driven company to a consumer-
oriented firm had not yet been realized. The management team experienced difficulties in 
breaking away from the performance trajectory that the company had always followed.     
While industrial designers at ASUSTek were involved in product development for all 
notebooks, they did not have authority over the “look and feel” of the final products. The 
company continued to compete on engineering prowess and manufacturing reliability. New 
activities centered on industrial design had not yet thickened and become part of core activities 
of the firm (Siggelkow, 2002). The choice of leather as an embossing material represented an 
extreme aspiration level along new performance dimensions. Without direct backing from one of 
the corporate founders, the project could not have been defined in the first place. Once initiated, 
the imposed aspiration level forced industrial designers to interact with colleagues that would 
normally ignore them. The continuous impetus to overcome technical barriers enabled new 
routines to emerge inside the company. New behaviors throughout the entire organization were 
induced when Tung played the “project manager.” The positional power of Tung forced lower 
level managers across functions (e.g., quality managers, manufacturing and mechanical 
engineers) to forego their local perspectives for this specific initiative. A new working norm  
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around the industrial design team coalesced. When ASUSTek released bamboo-ensconced 
notebooks a year later, Tung had already assumed a new role. The industrial design team this 
time was able to initiate this radical design based on an overall corporate theme of eco-
computing. During the same year, ASUSTek also signed a deal with Italian sports car maker 
Lamborghini SpA to design another special line of notebooks. Through repetition, activities 
residing within the industrial design team were augmented; the team’s award-winning designs 
were finally assimilated into the process of product development. Through top-down 
interventions in the form of a deep dive, a new set of core activities was developed, enabling the 
company to compete along new performance dimensions (step ‘5’ in Figure 3).   
  Arguably, no one can predict with certainty the market acceptance or the eventual 
business result of any particular strategic initiative. Even in the case of ASUSTek, the leather 
casing project was a bold experimentation with a particular industrial design by the company. 
However, since it takes years to develop various administrative mechanisms that reinforce the 
current strategy of the firm, top management does not easily uproot the current structural context 
in order to accommodate a single strategic initiative that may deliver business performance on 
alternative dimensions. And precisely for this reason, if not for the extensive top-down 
interventions that were made during the leather casing project, any initiative that required putting 
the activities of industrial designers at the center of ASUSTek stood a small chance of success. 
Moreover, even if some heroic lower level executive managed to produce and market the 
product, the core activities of the company would not have been rearranged. Without a deep dive, 
the strategic intent of transforming ASUSTek from an engineering-driven manufacturer to a 
consumer-focused organization might not have been realized. In maintaining its strong presence 
during project implementation, top management at ASUSTek provided more than targeted  
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structural linkages among highly differentiated units (c.f., Tushman, Smith, Wood, Westerman, 
and O’Reilly, 2007). Not only were new linkages to share and transfer resources developed, but 
the interdependence within the system of old activities was fundamentally readjusted at the 
operating level.   
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Previous research has repeatedly demonstrated the inability of established firms to make 
necessary and obvious changes (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gilbert, 
2005). Perhaps a more intriguing aspect is that failures often occur even when top management is 
aware of the need for those changes (Johnson, 1988). Structural interdependencies (Thompson, 
1967), divergent politics (Mintzberg, 1983), the threat of destroying existing competencies 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986), and satisfaction with the status quo, all make it hard for a top 
manager to reconcile major changes in core activities of the firm. The literature that confronts 
these challenges without resorting to an abrupt revolution as a managerial solution generally 
recommends top management to develop different types of organizational architecture. By 
structurally separating the organization from its pre-existing structures in a varying degree – 
ranging from autonomous to integrated to hybrid or switching designs – the firm can then 
accommodate the specific nature of different strategic initiatives (e.g., Christensen and Bower, 
1996; Cooper and Smith 1992; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996; 
Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003; Westerman, McFarlan, and Iansiti, 2006). We do not 
underestimate the important role of top management in developing the appropriate structural 
arrangements that foster the process of ongoing changes. In fact, in the opening example of 
Apple, a year after the introduction of the first iPod, Steve Jobs created a separate iPod division  
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and asked Jon Rubinstein to give up his key position as head of hardware to take over 
masterminding the iPod and music operations.
18  Obviously, top management needs to timely 
remap the structural context after early project implementation so that an explicit recognition of 
organizational successes by managers across all levels promotes the continuous trajectory of the 
new core activities. 
However, the attention to organizational structures, as the key antecedent to changes in 
firm activities, downplays the types of influence that the top management of a company can 
exercise at different moments in time. Rosenbloom (2000), who documents the metamorphosis 
of National Cash Register Company (NCR) from a mechanical to an electronic cash register, 
illustrates the critical role of the company’s new chief executive and top management team in 
driving the new configuration of resources and transformation of routines. Without active 
interventions from the top, the company arguably might have ceased to exist. When the structural 
context of the firm and the pattern of interaction among managers interfere with the required 
change, top management must actively intervene in the strategy process in order to prevent an 
eventual crisis. 
  The stable pattern of interaction identified in both Figure 2 and 3 does not only exist 
inside companies that compete in slow-moving industries, but has also been observed in large 
firms that operate in turbulent environments (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Researchers argue 
that successful companies in the latter category must possess simple rules or robust strategic 
processes to seize effectively the fleeting opportunities in the marketplace (Eisenhardt and Sull, 
2001; Bingham, Eisenhardt and Furr, 2007). Instead of striving for an attractive position by 
developing a tightly integrated, highly elaborate system of activities, an established company 
                                                            
18  Young, J. S., and Simon, W. L. (2005). ICon: Steve Jobs, the greatest second act in the history of business. 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. (pp. 285)  
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operating in a dynamic environment needs to co-evolve with the changing markets by routinely 
reconfiguring its organizational resources (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 
2001; Rindova and Kotha, 2001). The key challenge for top management is to maintain the 
optimal amount of structure that lies at the edge of chaos: flexible enough for spontaneous and 
improvisational actions such that managers can effectively seize attractive and yet unexpected 
opportunities; structured enough that managers still have the capacity to adapt to opportunities 
without sinking into chaos (Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham, 2009). But to attain this dissipative 
equilibrium of structure under the unpredictable environment, it is critical to maintain clear 
working norms and organizational priorities (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). This suggests that 
even in a less structured organization that operates within a dynamic environment, informal rules 
that govern how individuals should coordinate with each other are still commonplace, resulting 
in a stable pattern of interaction among managers across time. Therefore, when a firm seeks to 
shift its performance trajectory into new dimensions and requires new ways of behaving that 
contradict the existing pattern of interaction, the functional role of a deep dive remains.   
Other research suggests that CEO activism is especially important in a highly turbulent 
environment where a firm must commit “bet-the-company”-sized resources in a timely fashion in 
order to secure first-mover advantages (Eisenmann and Bower, 2000). In this circumstance, a 
CEO circumvents the bottom-up process that yields incremental investment proposals, in order 
to absorb risk that individual mid-level general managers will shun. Because the CEO takes 
responsibility for both initiating and approving major investment proposals, a rapid decision-
making process enables the company to move much more quickly.   
The case we are examining, however, need not involve big stakes. It is a move to a new 




19  The idea that top management directly defines technical specifics 
during the resource allocation process can be viewed as a deliberate “stretch” imposed by the 
management team, pushing the company to engage in certain experiential learning that it 
otherwise would not (Hamel and Prahalad 1993; Itami and Roehl, 1991).    By expressing its 
long-term vision in terms of the substantive content of a strategic initiative, top management has 
the opportunity to create an intentional misfit between the performance aspiration and the 
established organizational structure. The continuous involvement of a top manager during project 
implementation ensures the highest organizational priority in making timely adjustments, leading 
to rapid learning by the organization. Because the existing structural context of the firm is only 
bypassed, but not destroyed, a deep dive allows top management to experiment with a new 
strategy before it decides to commit further to any irrevocable choices.   
 
Conclusions  
The main contribution of this paper is to conceptualize a pattern of high-impact 
managerial behavior that, curiously, has been under-explored in the previous literature. By 
delineating a special class of changes that an established firm will inevitably resist, we 
hypothesize that specific interventions with the personal involvement of a very high-level 
executive is an effective way for top management to drive a shift of performance trajectory of the 
firm to new dimensions. We discover that when the bottom-up process fails, forced allocation of 
resource by the top management for new activities alone will also not be sufficient. Without 
active interventions in phases of project definition and selection, new activities will inevitably be 
driven to the periphery of the organization upon project implementation. Since resource 
                                                            
19  In fact, the strategic risk in this case lies in organizational inaction – a typical result of relying only on the 
bottom-up process.    
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allocation is an iterative process, a strategic initiative that fails to demonstrate early successes 
will suffer de-escalation in commitment. A deep dive thus significantly differs from the concept 
of top-down strategy formulation and resource allocation. It is an alternative change mechanism 
that top management can deploy, with a higher degree of certainty, in realizing its long-term 
strategic vision for the firm – a central task of every top manager.   
 
Future Research Directions 
More interesting, perhaps, is the question of how much technical knowledge a top 
manager must possess before he/she can carry out a deep dive successfully. Can a new CEO 
from outside the firm ever engage in this level of intervention? What happens if top management 
provides the wrong content? Will this lead the firm to prematurely abandon the strategic 
initiative, to irrationally escalate its organizational commitment, or to pragmatically redefine its 
content during the next rounds of review? Further research is required to examine more 
systematically the contingent conditions around deep dives. One potential research design could 
involve qualitative, longitudinal, case-based analysis of the impacts of deep dives on the strategy 
process across multiple firms within a single industry. Is there a dark side to a deep dive? Can 
they be overdone? Is the need to shift performance dimensions the only situation where a deep 
dive is required? What can cause a top executive to mistaken unproductive meddling as a 
functional deep dive? These are some of the questions that go beyond a theory paper can answer.   
Another related area for future research is the development of a typology of structural 
contexts and patterns of interaction among large organizations within the same industry. More 
quantitative methodologies, such as employee survey and organizational network analysis, allow 
researchers to compare the variations in behavioral norms across corresponding subunits that can  
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be commonly found in different companies. Such empirical findings could enrich our 
understanding about the role of a deep dive in relation to organizational change in more concrete 
terms.  
This paper has shown that a focus on actions of top management, such as the deep dive, 
warrants further systematic research. It is our hope that the paper will open new paths of inquiry 
into strategic change in complex organizations.      
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Figure 3  A Deep Dive as an Alternative Change Mechanism  
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Figure 4  Organizational Forms in the Taiwan’s Personal Computing Industry 
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